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Forum Demokrasi (Democratic Forum) :
An Intellectuals' Response to the State and
Political Islam
Abstrak: Sejak lima uhun terakhir, kehidupan politik Indonesia banyak
diut arn ai ke m un c u I a n o r gan i s asi - or gan i s as i i n te le kt u al ke a gam aan.
Tercawt peruma kali dddlah lkaun Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia
(ICMI) yang berdiri uhun 1990. Tahun-uhun berikutnya terbentuk Fo-
rum Cendekiauan Hindu Indonesia (FCHI) dan Keluarga Cendekinuan
Budhis Indonesia (KCB\. Sementara Persatuan Inteligensia Kristen In-
donesia (PIKI) dan lkatan Sarjana Katholik Indonesia (ISKA), yang
masing-masingberdiri tahun 1963 dan 1958, kzmbali bangkit bersamazn
dengan yang lain.
Di anura or ganisasi-organisasi tersebut, I CMI merupakan or ganisasi
c endi ki au an - ke agam aan pa lin g m en o nj o l. P e n gikutny a palin g b any ak
dan perannya dalam kehidupan politik sangat menentukan. Banyaknya
jumlah anggota ICMI didukung kenyataan bahua mayoritas penduduk
Indonesia Muslim. Sementara keberhasikn perdn ICMI lebih banyak
dimungkinkan elit negara yang memberikan dukungan penuh. Para
birokrat, mulai dari lepel menteri sampai pejabat daerdh, banyak yang
menjadi pengurus ICMI. Babkan ketua ICMI sendiri adalah Mentqi Riset
dan Tekno logi, B.J. Habibie.
Munc ulny a ICMI banyak dipandan g sebagai prese den berkembangnya
sekurianisme. Dengan pelbagai alasan, para pengikut dgdrna kin juga
turut mendirikan organisasi serupa. Selain itu, keberadazn ICMI juga
dianggap dapat mengembalikan Islam polirik yang pernah dibaasi
geraknyapada masa aual Orde Baru. Saat ini simbol Islam mulai banyak
digunakan dalam kehidupan politik dan berbangsa. Komposisi kabinet
m u lai di do m in asi o le h ha I an gan y dn g seti a terh adap H abib ie. Ke lo mp o k
ini juga turut membanjiri lembaga legtslatif.
Akibatnya, beberapa kalangan khauatir akan terjadi dominasi
mayoritas. Kelompok minoritas, sryrti Kristen, Hindu dan Budha, sedikit
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banyak akan rersingkir oleh arus mdyoritas. Bila hal ini terjadi, pola
relasi kekuasddn menjadi tidak seimbang. Setiap saat dkan muncul
ketegangan yang sulit dikontrol. Rasa kebangsaan ydng selama ini kuat
juga bisa terkiki* Dampaknya lebih jauh, pembangunan yang sudah
berj alan puluh an tah un menj adi diperraruh kan.
Beberapa cendekiawan turut prihatin atas berkembangnya sudsdnd
ini. Mereka sepakat untuk memberikan respons dengan membentuk
sebuah organisasi yang bernama Forum Demokrasi (Fordem). Dalam
deklarasi aualnya disebutkan, Fordem akan berjuang menegakkan
demokrasi melalui proses pemberdayaan masyarakat serta peninghaan
kesadaran politik rakyat. Forum ini juga bertujuan untuk memperkuat
posisi rakyat di hadapan negard yang selama ini masih terlihat lemah.
Fordem memilib demokrasi sebagai kerangka kerjanya. Bagi kalangan
Fordem, munculnya organisasi cendekiawan-keagamaan di atas dapat
melemahkan proses demokratisasi Indonesia. Dengan kata lain, proses
dernokratisasi akan gagal jika sektarianisme terus berkembang.
Sebaliknya, proses tersebut akan berhasil jika dilandasi oleh semangat
kebangsazn.
Selain itu, kecenderungdn sektarian juga dapat memperlemah posisi
rakyat di hadapan negdrd. Vajar kiranya kalau kemudian Fordem
bersikap kritis terhadap ICMI, yang dianggap telah dikooptasi negara.
Selama ini negara dapat menentukan segala-galanya bagi rakyat.
Sedangkan rafoat sendiri terlihat tidak memiliki kekuatan rnenarear ydng
seimbang. Akibatnya, negdrd sulit dikontrol dan pelaksana"an hukum
menjadi tidak menentu. Pada gilirannya, aturan main dalam bidang
lain, seperti ekonomi, juga menjadi tidak jelas arahnya.
Sikap Fordem ydng keras terhadap pemerintah dan ICMI melahirkan
konsekuensi tersendiri. Selain elit politik tidak mendukung, forum ini
j uga terbatas geraknya. Aktiztiws Fordem banyak yang diawasi oleh aparat
negdra. Bahkan salah satu kegiaannya pernah dibubarkan oleh pihak
keamanan. Tidak jarang Fordem dicemooh sebagai kumpulan
cende kiau an pemban gkan g.
Meskipun demikian, cenfu hiauan yang nrgabung dalam Fordem terus
menawarhan ahernatif tersendiri. Mereka berusaha memperkuat posisi
masyarakat melalui jalur demokrasi. Mereka juga berusaha menembus
sekat-sekat primordialisme dan sektarianisme. Dapat dipahami jika
Fordem mampu mengakomodasi kzlangan dmgan pelbagai latarbelakang
budayamaupun dgama Kehadirannya dapat dijadiknn cautan tersendiri
bagi negara seru organisasi-organisasi lain, khususnya ICML
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a n his capacity as a member of the intelligentsia and Indonesian
I ambassador to the United States of America, Soedjatmoko appealedI to the intellectuals of developing countries to maintain their "in-
ner world" when he made a speech at the Asia Society Forum in
New York.l He was of the opinion that these intellectuals had to
create a distance and keep aloof from the state, and instead create
independent voluntary associations in order to establish a sound bal-
ance between the state and society. They have to encourage the de-
velopment of social control to avoid the abuse of power by the state
and to ensure the people's participation. This opinion provides a
sufficient framework for the observation of the emergence of Forum
Demokrasi (Fordem 
- 
Democratic Forum), a voluntary association
of Indonesian intellectuals.
As it is apparent that during the last five years, the Indonesian
socio-political arena has been colored by the emergence of religiously
based intellectual organizations. The pioneer of these was the Ikatan
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI - Indonesian Muslims Intel-
lectual Association), which was established in 1990.2 Soon afterwards
similar organizations mushroomed i.e Forum Cendekiawan Hindu
Indonesia (FCHI - Indonesian Hindu Intellectual Forum) and Keluarga
Cendekiawan Buddhis Indonesia (KCBI - The Family of Indonesian
Buddhist Intellectuals). In the meantime, Persatuan Intelegensia
Kristen Indonesia (PiKI - Indonesian Protestant Intelligentsia Union)
and Ikatan Sariana Katholik Indonesia (ISKA - Indonesian Catholic
Schoiars Association), which were established in the late fifties and
the mid-sixties, were also revitalized alongwith these organizations.
Vithin this context, the position of Fordem is somewhat unique.
\ilhile other intellectuai organizations tend to adopt religions as their
symbols, Fordem prefers to use democracy as its main area of con-
cern. To some extent, such a distinction has engendered some conse-
quences for the existence of Fordem. Unlike these other intellectual
organizations, especially ICMI, which gained fuli support from the
state, the emergence of Fordem was very much disliked by the indo-
nesian political elite. Many members of this group construed Fordem
as an association of intellectual and political dissidents. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, if many of Fordem's activities became the subject
of suspicion from the security forces. According to the latest news in
the papers, some of their activities were banned by the government
on grounds of permits and security.r FIowever, although Fordem is
Stnd;d Isl4m;lea, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1995
166 Curcnt Is*e
viewed as a powerless organization, its influence is probably perva-
sive especially among the independent intellecruals of the country.
As its concerns are inclusive, Fordem is able ro arrracr intelligentsia
from different socio-cultural backgrounds and schools of thought.
For example, it accommodates intellectuals from Nahdlatul Ulama
(traditionalist Muslim), Catholic, Proresranr, Democraric-Socialist and
Nationalist factions. They gather together and form a forum for dis-
cussions and the sharing of ideas under the framework of democ-
racy, human rights, political awareness and freedom. Such concerns
are likely to surpass primordial inreresrs or religious specificity.
The Formation of Fordem
The emergence of Fordem is an inseparable part of the general
problems faced by Indonesians. Among these are the emergence of
political Islam, the increase of religious senrimenrs and restrictions
on political expression. The seed of political Islam itself surfaced in
the late eighties when the government approved the Bill of Islamic
Jurisprudence.a Ever since then the government has seemed to re-
open the possibility of using religious symbols in state affairs. It has,
for instance, supported the establishment of ICMI. Not only were
general Muslim intellectuals recruired, but also high government of-
ficials became the proponents and functionaries of this organization.
This policy came to a climax when the governmenr gave its full sup-
port for the creation of Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI 
- 
Indone-
sian Islamic Bank) to develop the so-called Islamic economic sysrem.
Minor voices against the government were then unavoidable. Some
critical analysts regarded this governmenral policy as an arrempr ro
attract the attention of Muslims, who had been left behind during
the first decades of the New Order.
The establishment of ICMI has been regarded by some circles as a
precedent for the growth of religious sentimenr. Adherents of other
religions cannot just watch the increasing domination of ICMI both
in the government and at the social level. Although ICMI declares
itself not to be a political organization, rhe position of its members
and the amount of support it gains have made it influential in almost
all governmental policies. As such many critics regard ICMI as play-
ing politics by using its members' influence, especially those who
hold higher bureaucratic positions. This tendency has indeed seduced
adherents of other religions to make their own alliances, which are
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intended in part to balance their positions with that of ICMI, and to
mobilize social support.5 It is for these reasons that the growth of
religious sentiment is unavoidable.
The situation was even worse when religious sentiment was mixed
up with political problems. In fact, political constrains have been
ongoing for some decades in the Indonesian New Order. By no means
neglecting the regime's achievements, social demands for openness,
democracy and human rights have become stronger in the last few
years. IJnfortunately, the government is not likely to be in favor of
these ideas.6 It still maintains the old rules of the political game by
rejecting the possibility of creating a new political party. It also re-
fuses the idea of oppositionalism even for the established parties. To
some extent, by using the idea of cultural relativism, the government
also does not like the idea of liberal democracy and universal human
rights. These attitudes cause activists to regard the government as
attempting to maintain its status quo by all possible means.
The creation of Fordem is based around these problems. It tries to
offer different solutions not by using religion as a symbol. Instead,
Fordem members are of the opinion that the establishment of these
religiously based intellectual organizations can make the situation
even worse.T According to them, such organizations are only able to
encourage people to rejoice in religious symbols, which in fact is not
the principle problem. Vhat people need at the present time is to
gain their rights as members of this nation. F{owever, as long as their
position is inferior before the state's power, their basic problems can-
not be resolved. Therefore, they argue, the empowerment of peopie
through the application of a democratic system becomes indispens-
able.8 People deserve their rights and their demands for them are
becoming stronger.
Apart from democracy, Fordem is very concerned with national-
ism.e The members of this forum are critical of the growing tendency
of all forms of sectarianism. They appreciate the achievements of the
first decades of the New Order regime in overcoming sectarianism.
This regime, according to their point of view, has successfully united
the heterogeneous Indonesian people, in particular by introducing
the state ideology, Pancasila, as the sole basis for all social organiza-
tions. However, since the late eighties the government has allowed
certain seeds of sectarianism to flower within national life. On this
basis the members of Fordem insist that democratization should be
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applied along the framework of national solidarity. It can be inferred
that on the one hand Fordem members see any sort of sectarianism
as possibly threatening national unity, and that democratization does
not always mean Westernization on the other.
Fordem, which is ridiculed as being a "marginal" organrzation by
established politicians, was formed in Cibereum, Cisarua, WestJava.10
Using the auditorium of a guest house, 40 intellectuals from different
parts of Indonesia met together in the middle of March 1991. During
the two days of the meeting, which started on Saturday 16 March
199L and ended the following evening, the themes discussed were
mainly centered on politics. Among the participants were: the head
of Nahdlatul Ulama, a traditionalist Muslim organization,
Abdurahman Vahid, and his former general secretary, A. Gaffar
Rahman; independent intellectuals and NGO activists Bondan
Gunawan, Dhaniel Dakhidae, Manuel Kaisepo, Aswab Mahasin and
T. Mulya Lubis. Also present at this forum was a leading figure from
ICMI, Soetjito Virosardjono, who later withdrew from Fordem as
he had different ideas to the other members. Some activists of the
1966 generation, such as A. Rahman Tolleng and Arief Budiman,
were seen among the others. Catholic priests such as Y.B.
Mangunwijaya, Frater Danuwinata, Franz Magnis-Suseno S.J and
Mudji Sutrisno S.J also joined the meeting, which was enlivened by
the presence of journalists such as Aristides and Marianne Katoppo,
Rikard Bagun, Parakitri and so forth.
The social background of Fordem members varies. Bondan Guna-
wan, who is the director of Hasta Manunggal Ltd., and Kristiya
Kartika were activists of the Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasionalis Indone-
sia (GMNI 
-Indonesian Nationalist Students Movemenr). Chris SinerKey Timu and Marsillam Simanjuntak were signers and activists of
the Petition of 50, which is regarded by the government as a dissident
organizarion. Meanwhile Eko Tjokrodjojo was an activisr of
Pergerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Republik Indonesia (PMKRI 
- 
Move-
ment of Indonesian Protestant Students) and Djohan Effendi was a
researcher of the Department of Religious Affairs. According to the
newspapers, the host of the meeting was Abdurahman 'Wahid. Some
participants received written invitations, while the rest were invited
by telephone. To some exrenr, this meeting was a kind of reunion.
"We rarely meet together. Rahman Tolleng and Eko Tjokrodjojo were
my classmates in high school",11 said Arief Budiman.
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According to Bondan Gunawan, although the meeting did not
prepare specific papers or an agenda, all the participants focused their
attention on democracy. This happened partly because almost all the
participants had experienced similar problems in their involvement
in socio-political organizations. Even though the meeting was infor-
mal, at its end they produced an important document called "Mufakat
Cibereum" (Cibereum Consensus).12 This document contains four
principles that function as a proposal of action to be realized in the
coming programs. The four principles are to widen the people's par-
ticipation in order to develop the nation's maturity through democ-
ratization; to increase communication between democratic groups;
to unite diverse democratic forces; and to keep up the struggle for
democracy through various means and publications. As the manifes-
tation of these principles, the participants agreed to establish an intel-
lectual movement called Forum Demokrasi. This forum would active-
ly take part in the process of uplifting political awareness and up-
holding a correct, just and healthy political life.
The responses towards Fordem were not all negative. Marwah
Daud, one of ICMI's leading proponents, viewed the creation of
Fordem as a logical necessity of the present situation.tr She was of the
opinion that this forum might act as an institution to provide an
alternative political education for Indonesians. In a huge countrywith
a diverse population like Indonesia, she argued, everything should
not come from only one source, the state. Thus, she reminded people
not to be trapped by the assumption that everphing that came from
outside the system meant opposition to the establishment. Similar
voices were also heard from some armed forces' leaders. Although
the majority of the members of this group preferred to be in favor of
ICMI and the loyaity of Muslims to the state, a tiny number of them
expressed support for Fordem. Those who were not in favor of
Fordem generally regarded the existing political institutions to be
sufficient in accommodating the people's participation. On the con-
trary, those who supported the idea of Fordem tended to see this
organization as a good sign of the progress of democratization in
Indonesia. General (Ret.) Soemitro, for instance, who used to be
Commander for the Restoration of Peace, Security and Order, viewed
the creation of Fordem positively.'I think Gus Dur fthe nickname of
Abdurrahman lVahid, ed.] is only willing to accelerate the progress
of democratization after the destruction of the PKI (Indonesian Com-
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munist Party, ed.) and after the achievement of several asPects in
Indonesian life".1a
The State and Sectarian Intellectuals
Fordem emerged amidst the blooming of sectarian tendencies in
the fields of regionalism, ethnicity and religion. Generally the mem-
bers of Fordem are of the opinion that such phenomena have dis-
couraged the spirit of democracy and national solidarity. Democratic
values are being subjugated by group interests which in turn hinders
the development of the nation.6 In the Monitor case, one of its re-
ports having triggered Muslims' anger, Vahid was of the opinion
that, apart from the Muslims' anger, the solution must be decided
through legal procedures.16 Ironically, by only considering Muslims'
resentment, the government one-sidedly abrogated the publishing li-
cense (SfLrPP) of this tabloid. This meant, according to Vahid, that
the government killed one of the institutions of democracy.lT To some
extent, such a policy may bring about far reaching consequences con-
cerning the internal relationships between Muslim grouPs and be-
tween Muslims and other religious adherents.
Wahid's ideas are well supported by Ian Chalmers' observations.18
The latter found that the Monitor case produced a schism among In-
donesian Muslims themselves. The government's decision to close
this tabloid encouraged leading conservative Muslim figures to de-
mand responsibility from the tabloid's parent company, the Kompas-
Gramedia group. This publisher is run by a Catholic group and is
allegedly seen by many Muslims as supporting the process of
Christianization in Indonesia. To some extent, such a decision also
legitimized the action of Muslims who acted violently towards the
Monitor office. However, moderate Muslim figures such as Vahid
himself tend to view the case as a set-back for the process of democ-
ratization in the country. On the one hand it raises the issue of ma-
jority-minority relationships and on the other drives the resurgence
of political Islam.
The seed of political Islam in the New Order period has been
growing since September 1989 when a group of 'ulamX' mobilized
support for President Soeharto to be reelected for the period of.1993-
7998.re Soeharto himself then supported the idea of the creation of
ICMI and gave his blessing to the Minister of Research and Technol-
ogy, B.J. Habibie, to lead this organization. This maneuver, accord-
ing to Fordem members, has become a potential threat to the democ-
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r^tization process which has been taking place for several years. As
long as ICMI dominates the national political arena and controls Is-
lamic symbols, the balance of power relations among Indonesians
will be shaky. The direction of political policy, for example, is based
on two extreme poles: majority and minority.rc As such the future
of Indonesian politics will probably be colored by tension at all lev-
els. Vhile the minority tends to be pushed aside, the majority will
certainly dominate all aspects of socio-political lives. The Monitor
case affirms that the government could not easily control Muslim
mobs when the latter destroyed the tabloid's office.
According to 'Wahid, were law enforcement and freedom of ex-
pression applied, this tragedywould not have happened. Unfortunate-
ly, Vahid says, such conditions do not exist in Indonesian public
life.21 On the contrary the government often violates the socio-politi-
cal rules which have been formally approved. For example, the gov-
ernment has banned some Indonesians from going abroad and has
withdrawn some publishing licenses (SIUPP) without stating any
legal reasons. Vahid sees that rule making occurs mechanistically; it
is only based on limited public opinion and poor implementation.
Court mafia and corruption are spread contagiously throughout all
bureaucratic levels. Vahid sees that only those who hold power could
enjoy the condition of law in this country. Therefore, he argues,
Fordem is certain that democracy must at the same time include the
transformation of social institutions and political culture.z
As the head of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Wahid's position is strategic.
His influence is not confined to the circle of NGO activists, but also
pervades to grass-root Muslims in rural areas. However, he frankly
refused to join ICMI even when Habibie himself asked him to do so.
He preferred to join Fordem which does not constitute any Islamic
symbol. Vahid, on the contrary, is very critical of ICMI's political
maneuvers, especially to those who use religious symbols as a means
of obtaining political benefits. Many Muslim figures crir.icize him of
being anti-Islamic. Against this criticism Vahid comments "Just be-
cause I do not join ICMI, some Muslims accused me of being dis-
tanced from Islam. This is ridiculous! All NU's programs are directed
to and inspired by Islam. If that statement is correct, the head of NU
must be a stupid person".x
Apart from legal enforcement, the political behavior of the state
apparatus is also a target of Fordem's criticism. Rahman Tolleng pro-
poses a different logic to show the paucity of democracy in Indone-
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sia. According to his point of view, the presence of political institu-
tions such as party politics, parliament and general elections cannot
ensure that democracy is running well in this country.2a He argues
that even in communist or fascist state such institutions can easily be
found. The criteria of democracy is instead determined by the extent
to which people's rights and freedom are ensured.In fact, some Indo-
nesian lows related to politic restrict freedom of union. It allows only
three political parties to exist, i.e Golongan Karya (Golkar 
-Func-
tional Group), Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP 
-United Devel-
opment Party) and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI 
-Indonesian
Democratic Party).
According to Tolleng's analysis, the New Order's political sys-
tem has two faces. Firstly the symbolic, i.e formal political institu-
tions such as parliament. Secondly, the real face which is divided into
two consecutive frames: the presidency and the Armed Forces.s All
decision making processes are decided by the latter two institutions,
while the former merely act as a legitimizing agent. As a result, law
enforcement is uncertain and the power of the state is difficult to
control. The Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR 
- 
People's Represen-
tatives Assembly) itself cannot undertake its main function of pro-
tecting the people. Tolleng points out the case of abolition of the
SDSB (national lottery 
-ed.) abolition as an example of the formalinstitutions'weakneses. The idea of creating the SDSB, which is simi-
lar to a forecast game, has actually been opposed by many parties.
However, the government was always trying to defend this program
while arguing that SDSB could generate funds for the national sports
scheme. Only after people from various parties rallied to protest against
this game, was the government willing to give up. Indeed, in her an-
nouncement of the abolition, the Minister of Social Affairs, Mrs. Inten
Soweno, maintained the consideration of the People's Representa-
tives. However, Tolleng says, it has become an open secret that the
decision was actually decided beforehand by certain invisible hands
as a result of high level political lobbying.26
Similar political behavior of the state also struck down the PDI
when it held a congress in Medan, North Sumatra. On this occasion
the state was widely believed to have dictated its own political will.
A potential candidate of the partf t Soerjadi, was forced to give up
because the state refused to acknowledge the validity of the congress.
Soerjadi himself was reported to have enjoyed support from the state
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in his earlier career, but later he did not receive such suPPort as he
abandoned his loyalty to it. Consequently, the PDI had to carry out
an extra ordinary congress in Surabaya, East Java. The state showed
a similar attitude to the final result of this special congress. It half-
heartedly supported Megawati Soekarnoputri, a daughter of the first
Indonesian president, Soekarno, as the new elected leader of the PDI.
Flowever, support from the consecutive members of this party seemed
too strong to be ignored. As a result, even though Megawati could
not succeed in overcoming all the acute internal conflicts, she was
finally able to put aside the government's pressure and appeared as
the leader of the PDI.
Such a tricky political attitude of the state is not confined to the
political field, but it is also apparent in the economic management of
the country. Although the state never makes public statements on
the real economic condition, for example' rePorts from some inde-
pendent and international economic institutions show that the Indo-
nesian economy faces a fairly major problem.u Indeed, the New Or-
der regime has achieved much in economic development. During its
thirty years of power, the government has eradicated absolute pov-
erty from almost all areas of the country and, to a certain extent' has
made some limited circles prosperous. It has also created a wide range
of economic structures and infrastructures' which are incomparable
to the same facilities in the Old Order period. As a result, the people's
education and mobility are increasing. However, Fordem's mem-
bers regret that these achievements are not likely to be accompanied
by the sufficient mode of management systems. As such the Indone-
sian economic system suffers from practices of bribery, corruption,
nepotism and collusion.28 To note just one examPle, that of the
Bapindo case, these practices appear to be common phenomena in
the country's economy.'When Bapindo, a government-owned bank,
was found to have a huge amount of bad credit, a commission of
investigation revealed that some top state bureaucrats had been in-
volved in the collusion and manipulation that brought this bank to
bankruptcy.
According to Gunawan and Budiman, another basic shortcoming
of the Indonesian economy is the practice of monopoly.n \ilith sup-
port from the government, some conglomerates occuPy all sectors of
the economy from upper to lower industries. They dominate almost
all strategic industries such as cement, paPer, vegetable oil, automotives
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and flour. These conglomerates also control the network of distribu-
tion for both imported and exported goods. As a result, prices and
markets are dictated by their will while other people have very little
bargaining power. Against this phenomenon, Dawam Rahardjo, a
leading Indonesian economist and NGO activist, illustrates the se-
vere conditions of Indonesian monopolies:
Monopolies should be limited. In the United Kingdom, one company
cannot dominate up to 50 per cent of the market share, but is restricted to
only 15 per ceot. Meanwhile, a 50 per cent monopoly is not yet considered
to be a problem in Indonesia. The bureaucrats may talk about it, but they
have no clear solution. To make business simations healthier, the ideal is a
10 per cent limit for each company.3o
Since the middle of the 1980s the government has launched some
deregulation policies. These are intended to reduce bureaucratic pro-
cedures and the high economic costs which have weakened the com-
petition forces of Indonesian businessmen. At the same time, eco-
nomic deregulation is also aimed at creating more equal access to
business life. This decision is to some extent successful. Many big
enterprises are growing and the rate of Indonesian non-oil exports is
also increasing.
However, the existence of these big enterprises is now a quite
dilemma. Most of them still enjoy support from the government in
terms of special protection or other facilities. Blatant examples are
the automotives, vegetable oi1, flour and paper industries, all of which
enjoy both government protections and deregulations. In other words,
they become giant powers by absorbing huge amounts of state prop-
erty. Eventually, the state itself seems to find it difficult to effectively
control these business actors. To take another example, Indonesian
conglomerates recently met in Bali to discuss national awareness.sl
Officially, the meeting was said to be organized by the businessmen's
circle itself, but many people believe that it was the government that
took the initiative. At the end of the meeting they made Deklarasi
Jimbaran (]imbaran Declaration), one of the main contents of which
was to reduce the economic gap. This may become an indication of
how major the bargaining power of these conglomerates is in direct-
ing the national economy. Even the state itself prefers to make com-
promises with economic actors rather than directly enforce firm regu-
lations. Therefore, according to Budiman, economic deregulation to
be accompanied by political openness.r2
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Economic liberation without political openness, Budiman says,
tends to encourage increasing conspiracy between political elites and
economic actors.33 As a result, growing social unrest will be unavoid-
able as the peoples' economic opportunities are eliminated and their
political rights are marginalized. Vithin this context, Budiman and
Gunawan are of the opinion that capitalism tends to benefit only the
middle and upper classes.l In the Indonesian case, apart from the
political elites, the Chinese ethnic group is the most privileged group
of the capitalist system. Such a gap drives growing tensions between
local people and Chinese descendants.Ironically, Budiman states, this
problem is actually driven by certain policies designed by the elite
bureaucrats who are themselves local people.r5 During the last five
years, for instance, regular labor strikes have been seen in many parts
of Indonesia, especially in the big cities. The issues being proposed
not only pertain to economic demands but also include racial prob-
Iems.
Increasing democratic values in this complex situation is not an
easy task. Moreover, the role of the middle class, which has been
viewed as the backbone of the democratization, shows a different
direction. Fordem figures do not see the activities of this class sup-
porting the democratization process in Indonesia.ft Indeed, such a
phenomenon is due in part to many restrictions, such as freedom of
union and of speech, which are applied by the government in all
social spheres. However, the Indonesian middle class cannot be con-
strued as an independent group since they are dependent upon the
upper class' authority. Therefore, the existence of a middle class is
not automatically as a pioneer for the democratization agenda. Struc-
tural bounds often heavily press this class to make a dilemmatic choice
between defending the status quo or loosing opportunities.
Francois Railon's ideas3/ seem to have similarities to those of Tol-
leng. Raillon regards the Indonesian middle class as a grouP which is
born in the era of industrialization, consisting of businessmen and
intellectuals, holding moderate but dualistic views, soft but unstable,
and basically consumerist and conservative. So that, it would be some-
what of an overexpectation to view this class as the machine for de-
mocratization. The New Order's middle class is clearly different and
is not the same as its counterpart in the Vest. Deliar Noer, a senior
political observer, holds the view that the Indonesian middle class is
far from the expectation of being a pioneer for democracy.s8 On the
contrary, he adds, members of this class are sometimes seen to be
involved in collusion with the state apparatus.
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According to Fordem's members, barriers to economic and po-
litical demo cratiz tion do not only come from the state. Some strate-
gic groups, which are expected to be on the side of the people, have
on the contrary strengthened the position of the state. The creation
of the ICMI is one example of how Muslim intellectuals let them-
selves to be coopted by the state.se On the basis of this, Tolleng,
Gunawan and Vahid are very critical of the ICMI members' politi-
cal maneuvers. They argue that ICMI's attitude may revive the spirit
of sectarian politics which has been minimized since the beginning
of the New Order. Although the government has put into effect the
state's ideology, Pancasila, as the sole basis for all political and social
organizations, it seems to take a risk when it gives support for the
establishment of such a sectarian organization.
Fordem's members are of the opinion that, instead of creating
narrow sectarianism, intellectuals must be committed to widening
social consciousness.{ This commitment is indispensable since the
position of the state is more powerful than society. In this context,
although the existence of the ICMI in the national arena has given
privileges to certain circles, it makes society's position even weaker.
As a result, the democratization process runs slowly as social integ-
rity suffers from the internal conflicts of its intellectuals. The future
of Indonesian democracy has become unpredictable since Islam has
been integrated into the state. Sadly, ICMI's proponents prefer to
rejoice in Islamic symbols within the state rather than strengthen
society's position before it.
Criticism of ICMI is also voiced by its own members like Rahardlo.
He, for example, calls Habibie a "super minister" to illustrate his per-
vasive influence and authority.al According to Rahardjo, Habibie's
influence is supported by a huge amount of financial resources which
are provided by the state-owned strategic companies. Therefore,
Habibie could easily create political maneuvers beyond his formal
authority, such as placing his close colleagues in the cabinet and legis-
lative body.
Compared with other cabinet ministers, the figure of Habibie is
outstanding. As part of his political maneuvers, for instance, Habibie
invited the members of the Petition 50, who are regarded as dissi-
dents by the state, to the state-owned air craft company in Bandung,
lVest Java. This event was covered by all nationwide mass media and
became headlines for a couple of days. Some people admired him as
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he was brave enough to invite dissidents to the state company. They
were also of the opinion that he was about to make a reconciliation
between the government and the members of the Petition 50. How-
ever, the most important thing about Habibie is that journalists al-
ways pay a lot of attention to his activities. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising if Simandjuntak regards TV reports on Habibie as "Habibie's
show time".a2
The integration between Islam and the state is widely believed to
create concern among other groups. Prior to the establishment of
ICMI, the government had supported the ratification of the National
Education Law and Religious Jurisdiction, all of which benefited
Muslims. This was an unprecedented phenomenon. At the begin-
ning of the New Order, the position of Islamwas marginal and it was
often involved in conflicts with the government. However, the present
political realities tend to take sides with Muslims, especially the ICMI.
Thus, quoting Affan Gaffar, a political observer, ICMI "flaps its wings
like a peacock".a3
Sectarianism seems to be the concern of many groups in Indo-
nesia. Hariman Siregar, a former student activist, argues that the sec-
tarianism tendency has pushed society to choose its own ways.# If
so, there will be no bridge connecting the state to society. The elite
revolves within its cycle and so do the lower orders. Meanwhile,
according to Tolleng, the global tendency indicates that the creation
of justice, democracy, and human rights are to be the responsibilities
of all nations. No one can avoid horizontal accountability for the
struggle to maintain shared values, such as human rights.a5 He takes
the example that Indonesians had to help the Vietnamese "boat-people'
when their government deprived them of their human rights.
Towards Independent Intellectuals
Fordem members are persistent in making bold criticisms of the
state's socio-political policies. They believe that such action is com-
pulsory for it is an expression of intellectuals' responsibility. The
New Order regime, they argue, has weakened people's bravery and
closed the opportunities for making constructive criticism.% People
are afraid of being regarded as the state's opponents or being accused
of the government's enemies. Vhen the state invalidated the publish-
ing license of Tempo, Detik and Editor, only a tiny number of people
expressed their disagreement. Conversely, Fordem members launched
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severe criticism towards the state for using an authoritative approach
in solving the problem. The state's action cannot be tolerated, they
argue, because these three mass media were not given the opPortunity
to defend themselves. According to Fordem, such a decision expresses
the elite's authoritarianism in weakening democracy and the freedom
of the press.
Considering the above facts, it may be assumed that Fordem mem-
bers voluntarily position themselves to be a critical force before the
state. This role is not new. In the course of Indonesian history intel-
lectuals have been playing significant roles in developing the nation.
As Van Neil tells us,az at the beginning of this century, intellectuals
were playing a major role in shaping a group of modern Indonesian
elites as the foundation for independence. The creation of post-colo-
nial Indonesia was very much dependent upon elite figures such as
Soekarno, Hatta, Tan Malaka, Sjahrir and so forth. In the dawn of
the New Order era, Indonesian intellectuals also proved their critical
force through their corrections of the Old Order regime and their
involvement in creating a new order.
Using Gramsci's perspective,{ the function and role of Fordem
can be clearly seen. Fordem members can be classified in terms of
"organic intellectual", elaborate social and political agendas for the
sake of society. They are not detached or value-free intellectuals, la-
beled by Gramsci as "traditional intellectuais". In this context, Rich-
ard Robison argues that Fordem's formation is a mixture of urban
and rural middle class reformists who are trying to build institutional
bases, which are not coopted by the state and ICMI, as a political
power.ae The Fordem is viewed as a basis for escalating political aware-
ness, instead of party politics. Their main concern is not gaining pro-
portional representatives in the parliament, but encouraging the de-
velopment of a civil society. Given that they work outside the sys-
tem, negative attitudes from bureaucrats and other parties seem un-
avoidable. Fordem is often even regarded by many as an association
of intellectual dissidents. This label is appropriate since, quotingJulia
Kristeva, the tendency of the new intellectual is disident.s Theywant
reforms in the fields of economy and politics by attacking the ruling
political power.
Regarding this srereotype, Gunawan argues that the pattern of
intellectuals' reactions concerning the present situation are instead
intended to create a new culture.5l All Fordem's activities are de-
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signed to attract the people's participation in responding to real eco-
nomic and political problems. Therefore, it is somewhat an overre-
action if the security forces are suspicious of Fordem, because this
line of thinking could enrich democratic life in rhis country. The
presence of Fordem is by no means intended to be a political move-
ment, but is aimed at increasing society's awareness of their basic
rights. Fordem, says Vahid, is nor willing to mobilize rhe masses,
but is willing to develop a democratic cuhure within society. If this
statement is correct, then there is no risk to political stability from
Fordem.
It should be noted that, although Fordem is still weak and mar-
ginal, its future seems to be not so claudy. Fordem members regu-
larly meet together and publish their ideas through various media.
They believe that political openness and liberation are rhe necessary
conditions for creating a civil society in rhe sense that people have the
freedom to direct their own lives. In other words political liberaliza-
tion is a process towards the development of basic rights and protec-
tion for freedom of expression. These ideas are parallel with Tolleng's
opinion in the early 1980s. At that time he was of the opinion that
the Indonesian development process was difficult ro conrrol because
it was not based on democracy, and did nor implement rhe goals which
were set up in 1966 i.e social justice and social participation.52 To
achieve these goals, Tolleng argued, the New Order's political sys-
tem should provide opportunities for the emergence of alternative
leadership and development strategies. However, according to
Simandjuntak,53 the government often uses rhe concepr of an
integralistic state, which was formulated in the 7945 Constitution, to
defend its status quo and to legitimize its actions. He asserrs that this
concept tends to ignore the peoples' sovereignry by placing public
interests above individuals' rights.
The possibility of Fordem failing in its mission is quite great. How-
ever, as Soedjatmoko maintains,52 the most importanr rhing for the
intelligentsia is not success, but the struggle to achieve the goals.
Fordem's aim for raising social and political awareness may be of
special note for the state and Indonesian Muslims.
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